Targeted Attack through Network Fingerprinting by Marechal, Emeline & Donnet, Benoît
Targeted Attack through
Network Fingerprinting




Received 30 November 2020; Accepted 01 December 2020;
Publication 23 March 2021
Abstract
Nowadays, simple tools such as traceroute can be used by attackers
to acquire topology knowledge remotely. Worse still, attackers can use a
lightweight fingerprinting technique, based on traceroute and ping, to
retrieve the routers brand, and use that knowledge to launch targeted attacks.
In this paper, we show that the hardware ecosystem of network operators
can greatly vary from one to another, with all potential security implications
it brings. Indeed, depending on the autonomous system (AS), not all brands
play the same role in terms of network connectivity and network usage
(MPLS vs. standard traffic). An attacker could find an interest in targeting
a specific hardware vendor in a particular AS, if known defects are present in
this hardware, and if the AS relies heavily on it for forwarding its traffic.
Keywords: Network fingerprinting, traceroute, ping, MPLS, attack, connec-
tivity.
1 Introduction
Fingerprinting [20, 23] is defined as the process of splitting network equip-
ment into several disjoint classes. This is achieved by analyzing messages
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sent by equipment and their behavior, usually in response to some form of
active probing. As such, fingerprinting is an expensive process as it could
require many probes to be sent, and thus time consuming [23]. In addition,
too many probes towards a network node or a subnet could easily appear
as an attack and, consequently, be filtered by the target. Recently, Vanaubel
et al. [42] have proposed a lightweight network fingerprinting technique
that is based on inferring the initial TTL values in packets sent by routers.
Vanaubel et al. have shown that it is enough to obtain the initial TTL of
two ICMP messages (i.e., time-exceeded and echo-reply– the so-called
router signature) to guess the router hardware vendor.
Providing such a fingerprinting is useful for several applications and
studies. For instance, it has been used in alias resolution (i.e., the process
of aggregating IP interfaces of a router into a single identifier) [16, 43].
It has also been used for revealing the content of MPLS tunnels hidden
to traceroute, as some MPLS behaviors depend on the hardware vendor
(mainly Cisco vs. Juniper) [40].
In this paper, we extend our previous work [27] by relying on an updated
dataset1 and by answering two research questions:
1. beyond the classic hardware vendor market share (i.e., proportion of
Cisco vs. proportion of Juniper, etc.), we ask ourselves what is the
hardware ecosystem within Internet and operators?. In particular, we are
interested in describing the potential role they could play in the topology.
Our findings in this paper show that, if Cisco largely dominates the
overall market, this is not reflected when looking on a per autonomous
system (AS) basis, where the distribution is more blurred.
Compared to our previous work, we also focus on MPLS [34] aspects
and how the router hardware is used within MPLS tunnels. Moreover,
we show that label values used by operators can extend the fingerprinting
technique of Vanaubel et al. [42] and help us identify hardware vendors.
2. if knowing the hardware ecosystem of an AS is straightforward and not
that intrusive, we ask ourselves what could happen if an attacker can
easily identify router brands and target specific vendor with (known)
security breaches? This question is motivated by the recent five vul-
nerabilities found in various Cisco devices (four of them leading to
remote code execution vulnerabilities, and one to a Denial of Service
vulnerability) [17] and by the discovery of Bleichenbacher oracles [9]
1We work on the most recent TNT data and also make use of a novel alias resolution
technique, Apple [25], to further refine our view of the operators’ networks
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(i.e., an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against some protocols based
on RSA) in the IKEv1 implementations of four large network equipment
manufacturers (Cisco, Huawei, Clavister, and ZyXEL) [15].
Those attacks are not limited to a few scattered devices, but could affect
many different hardware models for each manufacturer, as the vulner-
abilities are found in software common to many different products. If
an attacker is able to easily identify unsecured equipment within an
AS, they could easily target it and possibly disrupt the AS connectivity.
Generally speaking, the attack could affect the AS connectivity or use
the AS equipment for performing a larger-scale attack (e.g., DDoS).
In this paper, we focus on connectivity loss, as result of the attack. In
particular, we show that it is enough for an attacker to target an AS and
a few devices (of a given brand) to affect its connectivity.
Compared to our previous work, we also investigate attacks from a
multi-layer perspective with MPLS. We show that the network is more
vulnerable to attacks than it appears from a single layer perspective,
when looking only at the routing devices, without considering the MPLS
layer. This is particularly relevant because what ultimately matters in a
multi-layer system is the upper-most layer, as it is a reflection of the
service provided by the system to its users.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
how fingerprinting can be a valuable tool for an attacker and pose a threat for
operators; Section 3 provides the required background for this paper; Section
4 discusses ASes hardware ecosystem (Research Question 1); Section 5 dives
into MPLS labels and how they can be used to further refine our view of the
hardware ecosystem; Section 6 illustrates the impact of routers failures due to
attacks (Research Question 2) and provides mitigation solutions to operators
and hardware vendors; finally, Section 7 concludes this paper by summarizing
its main achievements.
2 Motivation
We present in this section how fingerprinting could represent a great asset
for someone with bad intentions. Attacks in the Internet are commonly
performed by worms [44], i.e., pieces of software able to spread in the
Network without human interaction. This makes them incredibly faster than
viruses, that need a human to take action before they can infect a machine
(e.g., emails). Worms are able to infect machines by scanning IP addresses
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and compromising any vulnerable target computer they encounter in their
scanning.
Worms can have different scanning strategies, making them more or less
efficient in infecting targets. The simplest of worms use random scanning, a
strategy where they scan the entire IPv4 space to find vulnerable machines.
Some more advanced strategies use preference scanning for example, with a
higher probability to scan an address within the same “/16” or “/8” network
than a random address, in order to focus on a particular area of the network.
Other strategies exist as well, and have been referenced and studied [46].
The key component when designing a scanning strategy is to reduce
as much as possible the scanning space, in order not to waste time and
resources on machines that are immune or that do not interest the attacker.
The most efficient scanning strategy is a hit-list worm [37], that builds a list
of IP addresses of vulnerable hosts into worm code and thus shorten their
propagation time. Indeed, Staniford et al. showed that a hit-list worm can
infect all vulnerable hosts on its hit-list within just several seconds [37].
Applying the same line of though, Zou et al. [47] presented what they
call a routing worm, that uses BGP information to reduce its scanning space
without ignoring any potential vulnerable computer. They show this worm
can propagate twice to more than three times faster than a traditional worm.
In addition, the geographic information that comes with BGP enables such
routing worms to conduct fine-grained selective attacks on a specific country,
an Internet Service Provider (ISP), or an Autonomous System (AS), without
much collateral damages done to others [47].
Combined together, a hit-list and a routing worm form an optimal spread-
ing worm, both reducing its scanning space and increasing its speed by
knowing addresses of a large number of vulnerable hosts.
Until now, such a worm was admittedly the best propagating worm, but
was rather a theoretical concept, as there was no way to build such a hit-list.
With fingerprinting however, it is now possible to easily determine which
hosts in the network are vulnerable, and boost the worm’s efficiency with
a list of IP addresses belonging to a certain brand of router. Fingerprinting
can thus pose a real threat as it facilitates worm propagation with topological
information.
Although a hit-list+routing worm is much faster than a random scanning
worm, the latter can still achieve impressive propagation speed with a very
high scan-rate. This is the case of Slammer [29], a well-known worm that
infected 90% of its vulnerable population in only 10 minutes. However, the
worm quickly dropped its spreading speed as the Internet was congested by
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massive traffic sent out from a large number of infected hosts. Many routers
and switches crashed under the load, and this disruption to legitimate traffic
was actually more harmful than the worm itself.
Despite Slammer’s incredible speed (without using a hit-list), an attacker
can still benefit from building such a list, if their goal is to remain under the
radar. Indeed, Slammer’ scanning technique was so aggressive that it quickly
saturated the network and was noticed early on by operators. With a hit-list,
an attacker is able to fine-tune their worm to avoid detection, while achieving
the same result as a fast-scanning worm that would fire away as quickly as
possible and get spot, whether it is by humans or by an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS).
Therefore, as they recommend in [46], it is crucial to prevent attackers
from easily identifying the IP addresses of a large number of potentially
vulnerable hosts, or more generally, from obtaining any information that can
dramatically reduce a worm’s scanning space. In Section 6.3, we present
several mitigation techniques for operators to protect themselves against
fingerprinting, and all the security implications it brings.
3 Background
This section introduces the required background for this paper. In particular,
it describes the fingerprinting technique (Section 3.1) we use for identifying
router vendors, as well as the main features of MPLS (Section 3.2)
3.1 Fingerprinting
The IP packet header contains a time-to-live (TTL) field used to avoid packets
looping forever when a routing loop occurs. This 8-bit field is set by the
originating host/router to an initial value (iTTL) that is usually and nearly
always a power of 2 in the list 32 (or 30), 64, 128, and 255. RFC1700 [31]
recommends to use 64 as iTTL value but in practice, this is not followed
by most router manufacturers, each one having its own policy that may also
depend on the protocol used [42].
Based on that, Vanaubel et al. [42] have proposed a router signature made
of a n-tuple of n iTTLs, those iTTLs being retrieved from different ICMP
messages received from routers.2
2To estimate the iTTL forged by the router, it is enough to find the smallest number
in 32, 64, 128, 255 that is larger than the received value in the TTL field of the IP packet
encompassing the ICMP message.
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Table 1 Summary of main router signature – the first initial TTL of the pair corresponds to
ICMP time-exceeded, while the second is for ICMP echo-reply
Router Signature Router Brand and OS
< 255, 255 > Cisco (IOS, IOS XR)
< 255, 64 > Juniper (Junos)
< 128, 128 > Juniper (JunosE)
< 64, 64 > Brocade, Alcatel, Linux (BAL)
Vanaubel et al. have demonstrated that it is sufficient to consider the iTTL
of two different messages (i.e., n = 2) to discriminate hardware vendors basic
pair-signature: a time-exceeded message elicited by a traceroute probe,
and an echo-reply message obtained from an echo-request probe. The
advantage, here, is that router signatures can be easily retrieved with basic
traceroute and ping exploration.
Table 1 summarizes the main router signatures, with associated router
brands and router OSes.
3.2 MPLS
MPLS Operations
The Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) [34] is a forwarding technology
initially designed to speed up the forwarding process. Nowadays, MPLS
has two main usages: (i) a basic encapsulation technique allowing to trans-
parently transmit packets through an MPLS domain using best effort IP
routes computed by an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), and (ii) a traffic
engineering (TE) tool allowing to better control routing and resources used
by some flows [36, 45].
In practice, one or more MPLS headers (called Label Stack Entry – LSE)
are inserted in a packet between the data-link layer and the IP layer. Each LSE
is 32-bit long and contains a 20-bit label value used for forwarding the packet,
based on an exact look-up of the label, to the next router (instead of using the
destination IP address). At each MPLS hop, the label of the incoming packet
is replaced by a corresponding outgoing label found in the Label Information
Base (LIB).
MPLS routers, called Label Switching Routers (LSRs), exchange labeled
packets over Label Switched Paths (LSPs). The first MPLS router is called the
Ingress and is responsible for tagging incoming packets with a label. Packets
will then be forwarded from one LSR to the next, until reaching the last LSR,
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Figure 1 The MPLS label stack entry (LSE) format.
which is called the Egress. The series of LSRs that carried the packets form
the LSP, or put more simply, the MPLS tunnel.
MPLS Label Distribution
MPLS tunnels need to be built and installed into LSRs by distributing MPLS
labels and their semantic in the MPLS LIB. According to the intended usage
of MPLS, a different protocol will be used to allocate and propagate the
labels [41].
Using the Resource Reservation Protocol TE (RSVP-TE) [7] allows
operators to deploy tunnels for TE purposes, and to reserve resources along
the path. On the other hand, using the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) [5]
on top of an IGP (such as IS-IS or OSPF) allows to use the routes computed
by the IGP but to encapsulate and forward the packets with the MPLS
technology.3
In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to tunnels as either RSVP-TE
tunnels or LDP tunnels. Finally, note that the RSVP-TE signaling protocol
may be used conjointly with LDP or not. These two protocols are independent
even if there is no reason to use only RSVP-TE for specific purposes without
using LDP globally within the network.
Revealing MPLS Tunnels
The LSE is made of four fields, as illustrated in Figure 1: a 20-bit label value
used for forwarding the packet to the next router, a 3-bit Traffic Class field
for quality of service (QoS), priority, and Explicit Congestion Notification
(ECN) [4], a 1-bit bottom of stack flag (when set the current label is the
last in the stack [33]), and an 8-bit time-to-live (LSE-TTL) field having the
same purpose as the IP-TTL field [3]. This means that MPLS routers may
send ICMP time-exceeded messages when the LSE-TTL expires, just like
a classic IP router would do.
For a packet entering a tunnel, the LSE-TTL field can be set differently
according to the router configuration. The IP-TTL can either be copied to
3It is worth noting that other usages of MPLS can also be made, such as MPLS for
VPN [32], MPLS Fast ReRoute [30], or Segment Routing (SR) [8].
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the LSE-TTL, in which case the different LSRs in the tunnel will reveal
themselves with a classic traceroute exploration via ICMP messages.
Or an arbitrary value, such as 255, can be written in the LSE-TTL field,
effectively hiding the tunnel from traceroute. Operators can configure
this action using the ttl-propagate option provided by the router man-
ufacturer [3]. Additionally, routers may also implement RFC4950 [10], an
extension to ICMP allowing a router to embed an MPLS LSE in an ICMP
time-exceeded message. This feature allows to doubtlessly identify MPLS
routers, as the LSE is directly quoted in the ICMP message (those tunnels are
called explicit by Donnet et al. [14]).
The combination of these two features (ttl-propagate and RFC4952)
has an impact on the discovery of MPLS tunnels with traceroute [14]. In
addition to explicit tunnels, TNT is able to reveal implicit (i.e., tunnels with
ttl-propagate enabled but RFC450 disabled) as well as some invisible
tunnels (i.e., tunnels with no-ttl-propagate and RFC4950 disabled).
4 Hardware Ecosystem
In this section, we discuss our first research question: what is the hardware
ecosystem within Internet and operators? We first present how data has
been collected and pre-processed (Section 4.1). Next, we check the signature
coherence for both IP interfaces and routers (Section 4.2). After this, we
provide some insight into hardware distribution (Section 4.3) and emphasize
on MPLS tunnels (Section 4.4). Finally, we discuss the limits of our approach
(Section 4.5).
4.1 Data Collection
We collected data using TNT [22, 39], a Paris-traceroute [6] extension that
is able to reveal the content of MPLS tunnels hidden to traceroute
exploration [40], revealing so more links and IP interfaces than standard
traceroute exploration. TNT comes with the advantage that it also auto-
matically collects the signature for each collected IP interface.
We deployed TNT on the EdgeNet infrastructure [38] between October 3rd
and 8th, 2020 over 15 vantage points, scattered all around the world: Europe
(6), North America (2), South America (3), Asia (2), and Australia (2). The
overall set of destinations, over 10 million IP addresses, is inherited from the
Archipelago dataset [11] and spread over the 15 vantage points to speed up
the probing process. Our raw dataset is available at http://gofile.me/2PfYg/b
rtxHbu2W.
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Table 2 Signature coherence – for both IP addresses and routers (after alias resolution)
IP Router
Coherent 89,1% 94,9%
Weakly incoherent 10,8% 4,8%
Incoherent 0.1% 0,3%
A total of 938,399 distinct unique IP addresses (excluding traceroute
targets) have been collected, with 34,297 being non-publicly routable
addresses (and thus excluded from our dataset).
We then used MIDAR [19], a tool based on similarities in the IP-ID field, to
perform alias resolution on our set of addresses. Alias resolution [18] is the
process of identifying IP addresses that belong to the same router, and can
thus yield a router-level topology from the address-level topology provided
by traceroute. This more concrete topology can then be used, among other
purposes, to study more precisely the physical infrastructure of routers, their
diversity, and the resiliency of the infrastructure. Out of the 900k addresses
discovered by TNT, MIDAR found 36,999 routers involving 91,037 addresses.
Additionally, we used Apple [25], a new technique for resolving router
IP aliases that complements existing techniques, such as MIDAR. Apple was
able to find 26,808 routers involving 87,492 addresses. In combination with
MIDAR, we were thus able to further refine our alias resolution with a total of
53,011 routers involving 154,439 addresses, which represents an increase in
coverage of 43% compared to the initial results with MIDAR.
Finally, from the router dataset obtained with MIDAR and Apple, we
applied bdrmapIT [26], a tool for annotating routers with AS ownership.
The objective here is to delimit as accurately as possible ASes in order to
better study their hardware infrastructure. Studying the Internet at the scale
of ASes, rather than at a global scale, is more meaningful because each AS is
an independent network, operated by different people with different policies
and technologies. This scale provides thus a more refined vision of the
hardware distribution, with all potential implications for network resiliency
and security. Moreover, focusing on individual ASes when discussing routers
under attack is more realistic than envisioning a world-wide attack.
4.2 Address and Router Signature Coherence
In order to evaluate the coherence of the collected fingerprints, we first check
if the same data collected multiple times by TNT always corresponds to the
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same signature. Following Vanaubel et al. [42] vocabulary, IP addresses can
either be (i) coherent (i.e., the same signature is always observed for that
address), (ii) weakly incoherent (i.e., two signatures are observed for a given
IP address, one being an incomplete version of the other – e.g., < x, y >
and < x, ∗ >), and, (iii) incoherent (i.e., several different signatures are
observed for a given address). We extend this vocabulary to routers, where the
coherence of a router is determined by the signature of each of its addresses.
Table 2 reports the results for both IP addresses and routers.
We observe that the majority of IP addresses signatures are coherent,
which is the perfect case for us, as there is no ambiguity in the finger-
print. Weakly incoherent signatures are slightly significant, probably due to
overloading, rate limiting, or filtering on routers, which prevent the device
to answer to one of the two probes. As such, we can simply consider the
signature of these addresses to be the complete one of the two. Finally,
incoherent IP signatures are very infrequent. Only 0.1% of the addresses
cannot be classified into a router brand, and have therefore been removed
from our data.
With respect to routers, an even greater majority of routers are coherent,
meaning that all interfaces of the router show the same signature. A small
portion of routers are weakly incoherent, and, as for addresses, we consider
the signature of a router to be the complete one among its interfaces. Finally,
we cannot conclude anything regarding the brand of a router for only 0.2%
of the routers. Note that these fingerprinting results are consistent with the
alias resolution process. Indeed, it is expected, by definition, that addresses




Leveraging the fingerprinting method, we can have a look at the hardware dis-
tribution in the network. Figure 2 illustrates the global signature distribution
for both addresses and routers in the Internet.
Regarding addresses, we notice that Cisco signatures are largely dom-
inant, with more than 40% of addresses in that class. The second most
important class is the BAL class (i.e., Brocade, Alcatel, and Linux machines)
with around 22% of addresses. After that, with a share of 16% of the
addresses, comes the signature < 255, ∗ >. This signature is an incomplete
one, meaning that the device answered to the traceroute probe, but not to

















































Figure 2 Big picture of hardware distribution – for both addresses and routers (complete
dataset).
the ping one. This class is probably made of addresses that actually belong
either to < 255, 255 > (Cisco) or < 255, 64 > (Junos) classes. Based only on
this signature, we are unable to discern between them, because those routers
did not answer to the second probe. In Section 5, we jointly analyze MPLS
labels and router brands, which allows us to assign Cisco or Junos with a
certain likelihood for some < 255, ∗ > signatures. Finally, the fourth most
important class is the Junos one, with approximately 11% of the market share.
The remaining signatures (including JunosE) are quite rare.
Looking at routers now, we can observe that the signature distribution
is extremely different. Cisco routers are still largely dominating the other
brands, with nearly 60% of the devices. Next comes the Junos class, followed
by BAL, followed by the < 255, ∗ > incomplete signature, which has
become almost non-existent. At first sight, we may think that the router
topology, derived from the address topology with alias resolution, provides
the actual hardware distribution in the Internet and corrects previous believes
about the share of the market, when looking only at addresses. However,
when looking at those results, we must keep in mind that alias resolution
remains an imperfect process despite considerable progress in this domain,
as discussed in Section 4.5.
Large ASes
For the remainder of this paper, we restrict ourselves to seven ASes of
interest, in order to study the hardware distribution at a finer granularity.
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Table 3 Basic data about ASes of interest – AS numbers have been anonymized
AS # IP # Router # Traces
A 428 165 45,964
B 2,511 892 608,305
C 896 180 721,584
D 762 224 586,879
E 630 140 138,217
F 510 93 53,347
G 1,116 404 481,895
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Figure 3 Hardware distribution, per AS.
To do so, as mentioned in Section 4.1, we used bdrmapIT for annotating
routers with their AS number. For security reasons (see Section 6), we have
anonymized AS numbers. Table 3 provides high level statistics on those
ASes: the number of routers, as well as the number of IP addresses involved
in those routers. The column labeled “# Traces” provides the number of TNT
traces crossing each AS.
If the global hardware distribution (see Figure 2) stated that Cisco largely
dominates the market, the situation differs within our seven ASes of interest,
as illustrated by Figure 3. Indeed, only AS A and AS B are dominated by
Cisco, while AS E and AS F are relying nearly only on Junos. AS G uses
a nearly equal mix of BAL and Junos. Finally, AS C and AS D deploy
essentially Junos with Cisco. It is now obvious that different operators can
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Figure 4 Hardware popularity, per AS.
have very different hardware infrastructure, with all potential implications
for network resiliency and security.
Finally, anticipating on Section 6, we present for each AS the hardware
popularity in Figure 4. Similarly to Sanchez et al. [35], we measure the
hardware popularity as the proportion of TNT traces crossing each hardware
brand. While the hardware distribution is already a first indicator of the
topological importance of a brand in terms of connectivity, the popularity
of a brand reflects more accurately the notion of topological importance
than the distribution does. Indeed, and this is particularly true for Internet
networks, not all nodes play the same role in terms of connectivity and some
are more important than others (see Section 6.1). As such, it could turn out
that, although a brand is largely represented in the network, the role it plays
in terms of connectivity and in terms of traffic volume it carries is not as
important.
We find that the hardware popularity is relatively close to the hardware
distribution for our seven ASes of interest, with some notable exceptions. For
several ASes (AS A, B, E , F), the dominating brand in terms of hardware
share is also the brand that plays a major role in terms of traffic. For AS
C however, the hardware popularity is quite different from the hardware
repartition. Here we see that Junos routers, that represent approximately
60% of the routing devices in the AS, attract almost 80% of the traffic.
The situation is the same with AS C: in terms of routing devices, the AS
uses a nearly equal mix of BAL and Junos, but in terms of traffic, Junos is
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Table 4 Main ASes MPLS stats – the column ‘Explicit (rsvp-te)‘ shows the number of
explicit tunnels remaining after applying the same filtering as Vanaubel et al. [41] and after
keeping only RSVP-TE tunnels
AS Invisible Implicit Explicit Explicit (rsvp-te)
A 0 2 74,751 24,066
B 0 296 124 30
C 5 1 6,684 3,269
D 5 1 8,110 2,450
E 0 0 10,513 5,900
F 0 0 60,816 44,895
G 2,124 0 0 0
actually more important. For those two ASes, Junos routers play a major role
in forwarding the traffic.
4.4 The MPLS Case
After studying the hardware distribution, we further refine our study of the
hardware ecosystem by considering various MPLS aspects of the ASes of
interest. TNT is able to reveal MPLS tunnels, discovering so more IP links
and interfaces than a classic traceroute exploration would. As explained in
Section 3.2, those tunnels can be classified into explicit, implicit, and invisible
tunnels. The number of each type of tunnel can be found in Table 4.
We see that the majority of ASes use explicit tunnels, i.e., tunnels that can
be fully revealed through a classic traceroute exploration (see Section 3.2
for details). On the other hand, AS G uses only invisible tunnels, i.e., tunnels
hidden to traceroute but that can be exposed by TNT (see Section 3.2 for
details).
Explicit tunnels can be further classified according to their usage.
Vanaubel et al. [41] developed the Label Pattern Recognition (LPR) algo-
rithm, which is able to distinguish between both LDP and RSVP-TE tunnels.
LPR is based on the analysis of the MPLS labels found in packets, excluding
so implicit and invisible tunnels from the analysis. Therefore, for the remain-
ing of the MPLS study, we will focus on explicit tunnels (and thus leave out
AS G from our analysis).
The proportion of each type of tunnel (among the explicit tunnels) can be
found in Figure 5.
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Figure 5 The different usages of tunnels.
Some ASes, such as AS A and AS F deploy MPLS mostly for Traffic
Engineering (TE) purposes, with a proportion of 70% and 100% of RSVP-
TE tunnels respectively. The other ASes decided to rather use MPLS as a
forwarding technology for their whole network by deploying a majority of
LDP tunnels. Nevertheless, they also deployed some RSVP-TE tunnels, with
a proportion of roughly 25% of RSVP-TE tunnels in each of those ASes.
In the last column of Table 4, one can find the number of explicit tunnels
remaining after applying the same filtering rules as done by Vanaubel et
al. [41] and after keeping only RSVP-TE tunnels. These tunnels will form
the basis for our analysis on network vulnerability in Section 6.2.
4.5 Limits
Despite considerable progress in this domain, alias resolution remains an
imperfect process. All techniques present the risk of false positive, and all of
them also have significant incompleteness. The inability to draw an accurate
router-level map of the Internet limits what we can study, leading in this
section on a lower bound of statistics discussed. Indeed, some routers will
simply never be found due to routers not responding to probes, or routers that
do not use monotonic counters, or do not share a counter across interfaces,
making them, by definition, undetectable by any IP-ID based technique [19].
As such, using different alias resolution techniques, as we did for this
study by combining Apple and MIDAR, can only lead to a more precise alias
resolution, as each technique complements the others and can compensate for
their respective weaknesses. Therefore, despite its shortcomings, we believe
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the router level better captures hardware brand distribution than the IP level
does.
5 Label Analysis
The fingerprinting technique of Vanaubel et al. [42] is currently able to
distinguish between four main brands of hardware, namely Cisco, Juniper
(Junos), Juniper (JunosE), and BAL (Brocade, Alactel, Linux). The technique
is highly consistent (Section 4.2) and can attribute a brand to the great
majority of addresses (Section 4.3). Nevertheless, a non negligible portion
of addresses (16%) cannot be classified, as they present the incomplete
signature < 255, ∗ >. This signature means that the device answered to the
traceroute probe, but not to the ping one, probably due to overloading,
rate limiting, or ICMP filtering on routers, which prevent the device from
answering one of the two probes.
We postulate that this < 255, ∗ > class is actually made of addresses that
belong either to < 255, 255 > (Cisco) or < 255, 64 > (Junos) classes. In
this section, we jointly analyze MPLS labels and router brands, which allows
us to assign Cisco or Junos for some < 255, ∗ > addresses with a certain
likelihood. We restrict our study to what we call the outer labels, i.e., the
labels found in the top of the LSE stack (see Section 3.2). For the rest of the
paper, we will call them labels for the sake of simplicity.
Overall, we found 512,531 distinct labels in our dataset, distributed for
each router brand as illustrated in Figure 6. From this graph, we notice that
Junos uses 202,573 distinct labels for its MPLS traffic, while Cisco uses only
27,534 distinct labels. For each brand, we also have the number of unique
labels, that is to say, labels that have been seen only for this brand, and not
for the others. 59% of Junos labels are actually unique and can be used to
doubtlessly identify routers that have the incomplete signature < 255, ∗ >.
Likewise, 20% of the Cisco labels can serve to distinguish the brand from the
others. Based on those unique labels, we were able to reclassify 10% of the
addresses in the < 255, ∗ > class that present MPLS labels.
We go further by analyzing the labels that the different brands have
in common. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of the MPLS label values
between the different router brands. As an MPLS label is 20-bit long, and can
thus take any value in the interval [0; 220− 1], we grouped labels in ranges of
30,000 values each for the sake of visualization. The upper part of the graph
presents the distribution between the different router brands (Y-axis) for each
range of labels (X-axis). It is worth noting that blank values in the graph

















































Figure 6 Labels distribution – for both distinct and unique labels (all labels).
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Figure 7 Label values distribution – the upper graph presents the distribution between the
different router brands (Y-axis) for each range of labels (X-axis). The lower graph completes
this information with the raw numbers of observed labels in each range (logarithmic scale).
Graph for labels in common to various brands.
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mean that the particular label range has not been observed for the particular
router brand. The lower part of the graph completes this information with
the raw numbers of observed labels in each range (logarithmic scale). We
can observe, for example, that labels in the range [0; 30, 000] are seen 27%
of the time for Cisco routers, 59% of the time for Junos routers, and 14%
of the time for the incomplete < 255, ∗ > signature. The proportions for
the other brands are too low to consider them. Moreover, this range of label
is extremely popular, as they have been observed 107 times. Knowing that
Cisco and Junos share 9,297 distinct labels, this kind of information can be
used to classify addresses in the < 255, ∗ > class with a certain probability
between both brands. For a classification engine, it is of course possible to
consider each label value individually (instead of grouping them in range) in
order to be more precise.
Looking at the graph as a whole now, we can clearly notice global pat-
terns. For example, labels in the range [270, 000; 780, 000] are observed most
often for Junos routers, and to a lesser extend for the incomplete signature
< 255, ∗ >. Proportions for Cisco routers are extremely low in this range,
or even null. This means that, for addresses in the < 255, ∗ > class that
present MPLS labels in the [270, 000; 780, 000] range, we can assign them to
the Junos class with a very high likelihood. These results are also consistent
with the different labels used by each brand (Figure 6). Indeed, Cisco uses
very few labels compared to Junos, which is confirmed by the Figure 7 where
we see that the majority of labels used by Cisco is constrained to the range
[0; 90, 000], while labels used by Junos are more widespread.
6 Routers Under Attack
In this section, we consider network attacks from two different perspectives.
The first one explores attacks carried out on particular brands of routers
(Section 6.1), and the second one investigates attacks on MPLS routers
(Section 6.2). Finally, we give some mitigation techniques to fingerprinting
for operators (Section 6.3)
6.1 Router Brands Attacks
Not all routing devices contribute equally to forwarding packets in the
network. Indeed, routers can span multiple different technologies, and have
different throughput capacity. There can be small routers with a few ports,
Network Fingerprinting: Routers Under Attack 365
large routers with a lot of forwarding power, routers at strategic intercon-
nection points, etc. Routers can also be limited by the fabric interconnecting
them (cable vs. optical fiber).
Therefore, if a certain router brand contributes heavily to network connec-
tivity in a particular AS, and if known defects are present in this hardware, an
attacker could cause great damage with little effort by targeting this router
brand in the AS. Knowing that an attacker can fairly easily fingerprint a
device (with only two simple probes), it becomes even easier for them.
Knowing this, and leveraging our new understanding of the ASes hard-
ware infrastructure, we now look back at our second research question: what
could happen if an attacker can easily identify router brands and target
specific vendor with (known) security breaches? Indeed, we already saw in
Section 4.3 that different operators have different hardware infrastructure,
and thus most likely have different levels of vulnerability to a brand-targeted
attack as well.
The hardware distribution (see Figure 3) is a first coarse indicator of the
sensibility to brand-targeted attacks. However, it does not a priori reflect the
topological importance of a particular brand in terms of connectivity, as we
saw with Figure 4. Therefore, to assess the vulnerability of an AS, we will
review our hardware popularity approach, and study the number of traces
(traceroute paths) impacted when a fraction of the routers are removed
from the network. We consider this metric to reflect the topological impor-
tance4 and to estimate which brands of routers carry traffic to a significant
fraction of the Internet. Indeed, Sanchez et al. [35] showed that the popularity
of a link or a router is strongly related to the amount of traffic being carried.
Methodology and results
To simulate an attack, we consider each AS separately and remove different
proportions (0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 1.0) of
routers for four brands: Cisco, Junos, JunosE, and BAL. Each time, we count
the total number of traces that go through those downed routers. For each
percentage, we performed the simulation 30 times, averaged the results, and
built confidence zone around the mean.
Figure 8 presents, for each AS, the number of traces impacted (Y-Axis)
given a percentage of removed routers (X-Axis), for each brand. The number
4A node that is topologically important will be sampled redundantly (multiple times) by
traceroute. This is due to the traceroute exploration process that statistically focuses
on topologically important nodes and links [12]. Therefore, the topological importance is
reflected in the number of traces crossing a node.
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Figure 8 Attack impact – proportion of traces impacted (Y-axis) given the proportion of
routers down (X-axis), for each AS.
of traces impacted has been normalized by the total number of traces for that
AS, in order to compare the four ASes together.
As expected given their hardware distribution and popularity, different
ASes are sensitive to the removal of routers from different brands. Regarding
AS B, we see that it is enough to remove 20% of the Cisco nodes to impact
more than 60% of the traces, while other brands do not have much of
an impact. In this case, Cisco plays a major role in network connectivity.
However, for AS C, AS E , and AS F , the removal of Junos is more harmful
to network connectivity than for the other brands, especially for AS E and
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F . Regarding AS D and AS G, they rely on two different brands (Junos and
Cisco for the former, Junos and BAL for the latter), which has the effect
of making them less vulnerable to attacks on one of those brands. Indeed,
for both these ASes, an attack on 20% of their dominating brand impacts
approximately 30% of the traces, instead of 60% compared to other ASes.
In the light of those results, we can definitely conclude that not all router
brands contribute equally to network connectivity, and that some of them are
topologically more important than others, depending on the AS.
Newly discovered vulnerabilities could be exploited by those seeking to
damage networks. Even though an attack targeting a defect on a particular
brand could be launched blindly without fingerprinting devices beforehand,
if the attack requires heavy resources from the attacker, they can find a benefit
in fingerprinting to focus the scope of their attack on carefully selected nodes.
An additional benefit would be to proceed stealthy and avoid detection while
keeping a reasonable scanning rate, as already explained in Section 2.
6.2 MPLS Attacks
The Internet is a complex system composed of several layers, each playing
a distinct role. The application traffic is mapped onto the IP network, which
is in turn mapped onto the physical network, composed of routing devices,
cables and fibers. With MPLS, an additional layer is in inserted in the stack
on top of the physical network.
Each layer has its own topology and properties, but depends on the layers
beneath itself to operate properly. As such, a seemingly harmless failure of
the lower layers could have a great impact on the upper layers.
In the light of this, we ask ourselves the question what is the impact if an
MPLS router is killed inside a tunnel? Is the entire MPLS tunnel unusable? Or
is there a rerouting mechanism in place to redirect packets to another tunnel?
Is it done automatically or does it require human intervention?
There are two cases of figure, depending on whether the router belongs
to an RSVP-TE tunnel or an LDP one. First, with LDP [5], tunnels are
congruent with the IGP: they simply follow the IGP routing decisions. In
the event of a failing router, the rerouting of the packets will be as fast as
the IGP convergence itself, and the impact will be the same as for a classic
IP-based router. Second, in the case of RSVP-TE [7] however, MPLS tunnels
have been engineered explicitly to follow a certain path according to the TE
requirements. The reservation state in each router is considered as a soft state,
meaning periodic messages must be sent at each hop to maintain the state. If
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there is a failure at any hop, RSVP provides messages to propagate the error
along the path, and to tear down the existing reservation [7]. Therefore, if a
single router is killed inside a tunnel, the entire tunnel will be unusable and
all the traffic it used to carry will be impacted.
There exists several protection mechanisms of the tunnels, each with
their advantages and drawbacks. Both Cisco and Juniper provide the ability
to configure and establish a secondary LSP to provide failure protection for
the LSP that is carrying a tunnel’s TE traffic. When there is a failure on the
protected LSP, the Ingress router immediately reroutes traffic to the secondary
LSP. If there is a failure on the secondary LSP however, there is no more
protection [1, 2]. An alternate recovery function is Fast Reroute (FRR) [30],
which protects MPLS TE LSPs only from link and node failures by locally
repairing the LSPs at the point of failure. A router upstream of the failure
will route around the failure to the router downstream of the failure, thereby
maintaining connectivity while a new LSP is established at the Ingress.
However, these two mechanisms require considerable configuration and
planning. We do not know if the protection of MPLS tunnels is commonplace
among network operators, but the proportion of RSVP-TE tunnels for each
AS (see Table 4) is large enough to justify looking more deeply into this
matter.
Methodology and results
First and foremost, we will only consider RSVP-TE tunnels for this analysis,
as they are the ones potentially vulnerable. We also exclude AS A from the
picture because the proportion of addresses in its MPLS tunnels that could be
resolved to routers was extremely low (around 3%). As such, an analysis at
the router level would have been meaningless. Coverage for the other ASes
was good and revolved around 84%.
To answer our question, we will use a framework for the analysis of
complex multi-layers networks, as introduced by Kurant and Thiran [21]. We
represent the network as a two-layers system, with the logical graph Gλ rep-
resenting the MPLS layer, and the underlying physical graph Gφ composed
of actual routers. Every logical edge eλ, i.e., MPLS tunnel, is mapped onto
the physical network as a physical path M(eλ). For example in Figure 9, the











Figure 10 presents the ECDF of the number of MPLS tunnels supported
by a router, for each AS. We can already see from this graph that many
physical routers serve more than a single MPLS tunnel. Indeed, for AS F ,
80% of the MPLS routers support 100 different tunnels or more. AS E follows
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Figure 9 Multilayer view – mapping between the logical graph, Gλ, and the physical one,
Gφ.
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Figure 10 ECDF – number of MPLS tunnels supported per router.
directly after with 60% of its MPLS routers serving 100 tunnels or more. The
failure of such important routers will affect the numerous MPLS tunnels that
are mapped onto it.
Next, to simulate an attack, we consider each AS separately and remove
different proportions (0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9,
1.0) of MPLS routers. Each time, we count the number of MPLS tunnels
that go through those downed MPLS routers. And for each percentage, we
performed the simulation 30 times and built confidence zone around the
mean.
Figure 11 presents, for each AS, the proportion of MPLS tunnels
impacted (Y-axis) given a percentage of removed routers (X-axis). Not sur-
prisingly given the number of tunnels per router (see Figure 10), failures
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Figure 11 MPLS attack impact – proportion of MPLS tunnels impacted (Y-axis) given the
proportion of MPLS routers down (X-axis), for each AS.
at the physical layer propagate quickly to the logical layer and multiply.
Globally, 20% of MPLS routers down can impact between 35 and 99% of
MPLS tunnels depending on the AS. AS B is most vulnerable, followed by
AS E , then AS C, then AS D, and finally AS F . In conclusion, we can say
that the behavior of a complex layered system in response to attacks is more
involved than what can be observed at a single layer.
6.3 Risk Mitigation
Network operators can protect themselves from fingerprinting, and all
its potential security implications, in different manners. The first one is
extremely simple: use a standard initial TTL (iTTL) in ICMP packets, as rec-
ommended by RFC1700 [31]. As the iTTL is not configurable by operators,
this suggestion is addressed to hardware vendors who must anonymize their
routers by ensuring that each packet is forged with the same iTTL.
A more sophisticated technique is to obfuscate the topology to prevent
attackers from discovering potential targets. An example would be to adapt,
e.g., NetHide [28] for obfuscating the links but also anonymizing the routers.
Another idea would be to diversify as much as possible the hardware
infrastructure, in order to make oneself less vulnerable to an attack on a
particular brand (such as AS D and AS G – see Section 6.1). This may
however require too much effort from an operator in terms of management
and/or investment.
Finally, as a last-resort solution, an operator could decide to completely
turn off ICMP packets (or at least filter them at the edge, as done with
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IGMP [24]), effectively hiding the topology and the hardware infrastructure.
However, this solution brings more drawbacks than advantages, and is most
often seen as completely impracticable, as traceroute and ping are essen-
tial network debugging tools (error messages, connectivity checking, PMTU
discovery, . . . ). Furthermore, the case is even worst for IPv6, where ICMPv6
cannot be treated as an auxiliary function, like its IPv4 counterpart, with
packets that can be dropped in most cases without damaging the functionality
of the network [13].
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated two research questions: (i) what is the hardware
ecosystem in the Internet and operators and (ii) what could happen if an
attacker can easily identify router brands and target specific vendor with
(known) security breaches? For this analysis, we rely on an updated dataset
and make use of a novel alias resolution technique, Apple [25], to refine our
view of the operators’ networks.
For the first question, we showed that, if Cisco largely dominates the over-
all market, the hardware distribution appears more colorful when looking on
a per AS basis. Different ASes can have very different hardware ecosystems,
with all potential implications for network resiliency and security. Further-
more, we explored various MPLS aspects of the networks under study, and
showed that it is possible to extend the fingerprinting technique of Vanaubel
et al. [42] to help identifying hardware vendors.
With respect to the second question, we demonstrated that not all brands
contribute equally to network connectivity, depending on the AS. An attacker
seeking to cause a lot of damage, with the least amount of effort, could target
a specific brand that plays a vital role in network connectivity, and do so very
easily given the simplicity of our fingerprinting technique. Additionally, we
also studied the interactions between the router layer and the MPLS layer,
and showed that the state of a single layer does not necessarily reflect well
the state of the entire system.
Ethical Considerations
We are aware that someone with bad intentions (hacker, unscrupulous com-
petitor, . . . ) could easily replicate what has been described here. To avoid
this situation, this paper also includes simple schemes that could be applied
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by hardware vendors to “anonymize” their hardware, while still allowing
traceroute and ping, that are valuable monitoring tools.
In addition, for security reasons, we have anonymized the four ASes of
interest described in this paper.
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Université Pierre et Marie Curie in 2006 and has been a PostDoc until
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